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Abstract
Machine learning models are often susceptible to adversarial perturbations of their inputs.
Even small perturbations can cause state-of-the-art classifiers with high “standard” accuracy to
produce an incorrect prediction with high confidence. To better understand this phenomenon, we
study adversarially robust learning from the viewpoint of generalization. We show that already
in a simple natural data model, the sample complexity of robust learning can be significantly
larger than that of “standard” learning. This gap is information theoretic and holds irrespective
of the training algorithm or the model family. We complement our theoretical results with
experiments on popular image classification datasets and show that a similar gap exists here as
well. We postulate that the difficulty of training robust classifiers stems, at least partially, from
this inherently larger sample complexity.
1 Introduction
Modern machine learning models achieve high accuracy on a broad range of datasets, yet can easily
be misled by small perturbations of their input. While such perturbations are often simple noise
to a human or even imperceptible, they cause state-of-the-art models to misclassify their input
with high confidence. This phenomenon has first been studied in the context of secure machine
learning for spam filters and malware classification [5, 14, 33]. More recently, researchers have
demonstrated the phenomenon under the name of adversarial examples in image classification [19,
49], question answering [26], voice recognition [8, 9, 47, 60], and other domains (for instance, see
[1, 3, 12, 20, 23, 24, 30, 58]). Overall, the existence of such adversarial examples raises concerns
about the robustness of trained classifiers. As we increasingly deploy machine learning systems in
safety- and security-critical environments, it is crucial to understand the robustness properties of
our models in more detail.
A growing body of work is exploring this robustness question from the security perspective by
proposing attacks (methods for crafting adversarial examples) and defenses (methods for making
classifiers robust to such perturbations). Often, the focus is on deep neural networks, e.g., see [11, 22,
34, 36, 41, 45, 51, 57]. While there has been success with robust classifiers on simple datasets [29, 34,
42, 46], more complicated datasets still exhibit a large gap between “standard” and robust accuracy [2,
11]. An implicit assumption underlying most of this work is that the same training dataset that
enables good standard accuracy also suffices to train a robust model. However, it is unclear if this
assumption is valid.
So far, the generalization aspects of adversarially robust classification have not been thoroughly
investigated. Since adversarial robustness is a learning problem, the statistical perspective is of
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integral importance. A key observation is that adversarial examples are not at odds with the
standard notion of generalization as long as they occupy only a small total measure under the data
distribution. So to achieve adversarial robustness, a classifier must generalize in a stronger sense.
We currently do not have a good understanding of how such a stronger notion of generalization
compares to standard “benign” generalization, i.e., without an adversary.
In this work, we address this gap and explore the statistical foundations of adversarially robust
generalization. We focus on sample complexity as a natural starting point since it underlies the core
question of when it is possible to learn an adversarially robust classifier. Concretely, we pose the
following question:
How does the sample complexity of standard generalization compare to that of adversarially
robust generalization?
To study this question, we analyze robust generalization in two distributional models. By focusing
on specific distributions, we can establish information-theoretic lower bounds and describe the exact
sample complexity requirements for generalization. We find that even for a simple data distribution
such as a mixture of two class-conditional Gaussians, the sample complexity of robust generalization
is significantly larger than that of standard generalization. Our lower bound holds for any model and
learning algorithm. Hence no amount of algorithmic ingenuity is able to overcome this limitation.
In spite of this negative result, simple datasets such as MNIST have recently seen significant
progress in terms of adversarial robustness [29, 34, 42, 46]. The most robust models achieve accuracy
around 90% against large `∞-perturbations. To better understand this discrepancy with our first
theoretical result, we also study a second distributional model with binary features. This binary data
model has the same standard generalization behavior as the previous Gaussian model. Moreover, it
also suffers from a significantly increased sample complexity whenever one employs linear classifiers
to achieve adversarially robust generalization. Nevertheless, a slightly non-linear classifier that
utilizes thresholding turns out to recover the smaller sample complexity of standard generalization.
Since MNIST is a mostly binary dataset, our result provides evidence that `∞-robustness on MNIST
is significantly easier than on other datasets. Moreover, our results show that distributions with
similar sample complexity for standard generalization can still exhibit considerably different sample
complexity for robust generalization.
To complement our theoretical results, we conduct a range of experiments on MNIST, CIFAR10,
and SVHN. By subsampling the datasets at various rates, we study the impact of sample size
on adversarial robustness. When plotted as a function of training set size, our results show that
the standard accuracy on SVHN indeed plateaus well before the adversarial accuracy reaches its
maximum. On MNIST, explicitly adding thresholding to the model during training significantly
reduces the sample complexity, similar to our upper bound in the binary data model. On CIFAR10,
the situation is more nuanced because there are no known approaches that achieve more than 50%
accuracy even against a mild adversary. But as we show in the next subsection, there is clear
evidence for overfitting in the current state-of-the-art methods.
Overall, our results suggest that current approaches may be unable to attain higher adversarial
accuracy on datasets such as CIFAR10 for a fundamental reason: the dataset may not be large
enough to train a standard convolutional network robustly. Moreover, our lower bounds illustrate
that the existence of adversarial examples should not necessarily be seen as a shortcoming of specific
classification methods. Already in a simple data model, adversarial examples provably occur for
any learning approach, even when the classifier already achieves high standard accuracy. So while
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Figure 1: Classification accuracies for robust optimization on MNIST and CIFAR10. In both cases,
we trained standard convolutional networks to be robust to `∞-perturbations of the input. On
MNIST, the robust test error closely tracks the corresponding training error and the model achieves
high robust accuracy. On CIFAR10, the model still achieves a good natural (non-adversarial)
test error, but there is a significant generalization gap for the robust accuracy. This phenomenon
motivates our study of adversarially robust generalization.
vulnerability to adversarial `∞-perturbations might seem counter-intuitive at first, in some regimes
it is an unavoidable consequence of working in a statistical setting.
1.1 A motivating example: Overfitting on CIFAR10
Before we describe our main results, we briefly highlight the importance of generalization for
adversarial robustness via two experiments on MNIST and CIFAR10. In both cases, our goal is to
learn a classifier that achieves good test accuracy even under `∞-bounded perturbations. We follow
the standard robust optimization approach [4, 34, 53] – also known as adversarial training [19, 49] –
and (approximately) solve the saddle point problem
min
θ
E
x
[
max
‖x′−x‖∞≤ε
loss(θ, x′)
]
via stochastic gradient descent over the model parameters θ. We utilize projected gradient descent
for the inner maximization problem over allowed perturbations of magnitude ε (see [34] for details).
Figure 1 displays the training curves for three quantities: (i) adversarial training error, (ii) adversarial
test error, and (iii) standard test error.
The results show that on MNIST, robust optimization is able to learn a model with around 90%
adversarial accuracy and a relatively small gap between training and test error. However, CIFAR10
offers a different picture. Here, the model (a wide residual network [59]) is still able to fully fit the
training set even against an adversary, but the generalization gap is significantly larger. The model
only achieves 47% adversarial test accuracy, which is about 50% lower than its training accuracy.1
Moreover, the standard test error is about 87%, so the failure of generalization indeed primarily
1We remark that this accuracy is still currently the best published robust accuracy on CIFAR10 [2]. For instance,
contemporary approaches to architecture tuning do not yield better robust accuracies [13].
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occurs in the context of adversarial robustness. This failure might be surprising particularly since
properly tuned convolutional networks rarely overfit much on standard vision datasets.
1.2 Outline of the paper
In the next section, we describe our main theoretical results at a high level. Sections 3 and 4 then
provide more details for our lower bounds on `∞-robust generalization. Section 5 complements
these results with experiments. We conclude with a discussion of our results and future research
directions.
2 Theoretical Results
Our theoretical results concern statistical aspects of adversarially robust classification. In order to
understand how properties of data affect the number of samples needed for robust generalization, we
study two concrete distributional models. While our two data models are clearly much simpler than
the image datasets currently being used in the experimental work on `∞-robustness, we believe that
the simplicity of our models is a strength in this context.
After all, the fact that we can establish a separation between standard and robust generalization
already in our Gaussian data model is evidence that the existence of adversarial examples for neural
networks should not come as a surprise. The same phenomenon (i.e., classifiers with just enough
samples for high standard accuracy necessarily being vulnerable to `∞- attacks) already occurs in
much simpler settings such as a mixture of two Gaussians.
Also, our main contribution is a lower bound. So establishing a hardness result for a simple
problem means that more complicated distributional setups that can “simulate” the Gaussian model
directly inherit the same hardness.
Finally, as we describe in the subsection on the Bernoulli model, the benefits of the thresholding
layer predicted by our theoretical analysis do indeed appear in experiments on MNIST as well. Since
multiple defenses against adversarial examples have been primarily evaluated on MNIST [29, 42,
46], it is important to note that `∞-robustness on MNIST is a particularly easy case: adding a
simple thresholding layer directly yields nearly state-of-the-art robustness against moderately strong
adversaries (ε = 0.1), without any further changes to the model architecture or training algorithm.
2.1 The Gaussian model
Our first data model is a mixture of two spherical Gaussians with one component per class.
Definition 1 (Gaussian model). Let θ? ∈ Rd be the per-class mean vector and let σ > 0 be the
variance parameter. Then the (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model is defined by the following distribution over
(x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1}: First, draw a label y ∈ {±1} uniformly at random. Then sample the data point
x ∈ Rd from N (y · θ?, σ2I).
While not explicitly specified in the definition, we will use the Gaussian model in the regime
where the norm of the vector θ? is approximately
√
d. Hence the main free parameter for controlling
the difficulty of the classification task is the variance σ2, which controls the amount of overlap
between the two classes.
To contrast the notions of “standard” and “robust” generalization, we briefly recap a standard
definition of classification error.
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Definition 2 (Classification error). Let P : Rd×{±1} → R be a distribution. Then the classification
error β of a classifier f : Rd → {±1} is defined as β = P(x,y)∼P [f(x) 6= y].
Next, we define our main quantity of interest, which is an adversarially robust counterpart of
the above classification error. Instead of counting misclassifications under the data distribution, we
allow a bounded worst-case perturbation before passing the perturbed sample to the classifier.
Definition 3 (Robust classification error). Let P : Rd × {±1} → R be a distribution and let
B : Rd → P(Rd) be a perturbation set.2 Then the B-robust classification error β of a classifier
f : Rd → {±1} is defined as β = P(x,y)∼P [∃x′ ∈ B(x) : f(x′) 6= y].
Since `∞-perturbations have recently received a significant amount of attention, we focus on
robustness to `∞-bounded adversaries in our work. For this purpose, we define the perturbation set
Bε∞(x) = {x′ ∈ Rd | ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ ε}. To simplify notation, we refer to robustness with respect to
this set also as `ε∞-robustness. As we remark in the discussion section, understanding generalization
for other measures of robustness (`2, rotatations, etc.) is an important direction for future work.
Standard generalization. The Gaussian model has one parameter for controlling the difficulty
of learning a good classifier. In order to simplify the following bounds, we study a regime where it is
possible to achieve good standard classification error from a single sample.3 As we will see later, this
also allows us to calibrate our two data models to have comparable standard sample complexity.
Concretely, we prove the following theorem, which is a direct consequence of Gaussian concen-
tration. Note that in this theorem we use a linear classifier : for a vector w, the linear classifier
fw : Rd → {±1} is defined as fw(x) = sgn(〈w, x〉).
Theorem 4. Let (x, y) be drawn from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d and σ ≤ c · d1/4
where c is a universal constant. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the vector ŵ = y · x. Then with high probability, the
linear classifier fŵ has classification error at most 1%.
To minimize the number of parameters in our bounds, we have set the error probability to 1%.
By tuning the model parameters appropriately, it is possible to achieve a vanishingly small error
probability from a single sample (see Corollary 19 in Appendix A.1).
Robust generalization. As we just demonstrated, we can easily achieve standard generalization
from only a single sample in our Gaussian model. We now show that achieving a low `∞-robust
classification error requires significantly more samples. To this end, we begin with a natural
strengthening of Theorem 4 and prove that the (class-weighted) sample mean can also be a robust
classifier (given sufficient data).
Theorem 5. Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d
and σ ≤ c1d1/4. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the weighted mean vector ŵ = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi. Then with high probability,
the linear classifier fŵ has `ε∞-robust classification error at most 1% if
n ≥
{
1 for ε ≤ 14d−1/4
c2 ε
2
√
d for 14d
−1/4 ≤ ε ≤ 14
.
2We write P(Rd) to denote the power set of Rd, i.e., the set of subsets of Rd.
3We remark that it is also possible to study a more general setting where standard generalization requires a larger
number of samples.
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We refer the reader to Corollary 23 in Appendix A.1 for the details. As before, c1 and c2 are two
universal constants. Overall, the theorem shows that it is possible to learn an `ε∞-robust classifier
in the Gaussian model as long as ε is bounded by a small constant and we have a large number of
samples.
Next, we show that this significantly increased sample complexity is necessary. Our main theorem
establishes a lower bound for all learning algorithms, which we formalize as functions from data
samples to binary classifiers. In particular, the lower bound applies not only to learning linear
classifiers.
Theorem 6. Let gn be any learning algorithm, i.e., a function from n samples to a binary classifier
fn. Moreover, let σ = c1 · d1/4, let ε ≥ 0, and let θ ∈ Rd be drawn from N (0, I). We also draw n
samples from the (θ, σ)-Gaussian model. Then the expected `ε∞-robust classification error of fn is at
least (1− 1/d)12 if
n ≤ c2 ε
2
√
d
log d
.
The proof of the theorem can be found in Corollary 23 (Appendix A.2) and we provide a brief
sketch in Section 3. It is worth noting that the classification error 1/2 in the lower bound is tight. A
classifier that always outputs a fixed prediction trivially achieves perfect robustness on one of the
two classes and hence robust accuracy 1/2.
Comparing Theorems 5 and 6, we see that the sample complexity n required for robust general-
ization is bounded as
c
log d
≤ n
ε2
√
d
≤ c′ .
Hence the lower bound is nearly tight in our regime of interest. When the perturbation has constant
`∞-norm, the sample complexity of robust generalization is larger than that of standard generalization
by
√
d, i.e., polynomial in the problem dimension. This shows that for high-dimensional problems,
adversarial robustness can provably require a significantly larger number of samples.
Finally, we remark that our lower bound applies also to a more restricted adversary. As we
outline in Sections 3, the proof uses only a single adversarial perturbation per class. As a result,
the lower bound provides transferable adversarial examples and applies to worst-case distribution
shifts without a classifier-adaptive adversary. We refer the reader to Section 7 for a more detailed
discussion.
2.2 The Bernoulli model
As mentioned in the introduction, simpler datasets such as MNIST have recently seen significant
progress in terms of `∞-robustness. We now investigate a possible mechanism underlying these
advances. To this end, we study a second distributional model that highlights how the data
distribution can significantly affect the achievable robustness. The second data model is defined on
the hypercube {±1}d, and the two classes are represented by opposite vertices of that hypercube.
When sampling a datapoint for a given class, we flip each bit of the corresponding class vertex with
a certain probability. This data model is inspired by the MNIST dataset because MNIST images are
close to binary (many pixels are almost fully black or white).
Definition 7 (Bernoulli model). Let θ? ∈ {±1}d be the per-class mean vector and let τ > 0 be the
class bias parameter. Then the (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model is defined by the following distribution over
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(x, y) ∈ {±1}d × {±1}: First, draw a label y ∈ {±1} uniformly at random from its domain. Then
sample the data point x ∈ {±1}d by sampling each coordinate xi from the distribution
xi =
{
y · θ?i with probability 1/2 + τ
−y · θ?i with probability 1/2− τ
.
As in the previous subsection, the model has one parameter for controlling the difficulty of
learning. A small value of τ makes the samples less correlated with their respective class vectors
and hence leads to a harder classification problem. Note that both the Gaussian and the Bernoulli
model are defined by simple sub-Gaussian distributions. Nevertheless, we will see that they differ
significantly in terms of robust sample complexity.
Standard generalization. As in the Gaussian model, we first calibrate the distribution so that
we can learn a classifier with good standard accuracy from a single sample.4 The following theorem is
a direct consequence of the fact that bounded random variables exhibit sub-Gaussian concentration.
Theorem 8. Let (x, y) be drawn from a (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model with τ ≥ c · d−1/4 where c is a
universal constant. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the vector ŵ = y ·x. Then with high probability, the linear classifier
fŵ has classification error at most 1%.
To simplify the bound, we have set the error probability to be 1% as in the Gaussian model. We
refer the reader to Corollary 28 in Appendix B.1 for the proof.
Robust generalization. Next, we investigate the sample complexity of robust generalization in
our Bernoulli model. For linear classifiers, a small robust classification error again requires a large
number of samples:
Theorem 9. Let gn be a linear classifier learning algorithm, i.e., a function from n samples to a
linear classifier fn. Suppose that we choose θ? uniformly at random from {±1}d and draw n samples
from the (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model with τ = c1 · d−1/4. Moreover, let ε < 3τ and 0 < γ < 1/2. Then the
expected `ε∞-robust classification error of fn is at least
1
2 − γ if
n ≤ c2 ε
2γ2d
log d/γ
.
We provide a proof sketch in Section 4 and the full proof in Appendix B.2. At first, the lower
bound for linear classifiers might suggest that `∞-robustness requires an inherently larger sample
complexity here as well. However, in contrast to the Gaussian model, non-linear classifiers can achieve
a significantly improved robustness. In particular, consider the following thresholding operation
T : Rd → Rd which is defined element-wise as
T (x)i =
{
+1 if xi ≥ 0
−1 otherwise .
It is easy to see that for ε < 1, the thresholding operator undoes the action of any `∞-bounded
adversary, i.e., we have T (Bε∞(x)) = {x} for any x ∈ {±1}d. Hence we can combine the thresholding
operator with the classifier learned from a single sample to get the following upper bound.
4To be precise, the two distributions have comparable sample complexity for standard generalization in the regime
where σ ≈ τ−1.
7
Theorem 10. Let (x, y) be drawn from a (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model with τ ≥ c · d−1/4 where c is a
universal constant. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the vector ŵ = yx. Then with high probability, the classifier fŵ ◦T
has `ε∞-robust classification error at most 1% for any ε < 1.
This theorem shows a stark contrast to the Gaussian case. Although both models have similar
sample complexity for standard generalization, there is a
√
d gap between the `∞-robust sample
complexity for the Bernoulli and Gaussian models. This discrepancy provides evidence that robust
generalization requires a more nuanced understanding of the data distribution than standard
generalization.
In isolation, the thresholding step might seem specific to the Bernoulli model studied here.
However, our experiments in Section 5 show that an explicit thresholding layer also significantly
improves the sample complexity of training a robust neural network on MNIST. We conjecture
that the effectiveness of thresholding is behind many of the successful defenses against adversarial
examples on MNIST (for instance, see Appendix C in [34]).
3 Lower Bounds for the Gaussian Model
Recall our main theoretical result: In the Gaussian model, no algorithm can produce a robust
classifier unless it has seen a large number of samples. In particular, we give a nearly tight trade-off
between the number of samples and the `∞-robustness of the classifier. The following theorem is the
technical core of this lower bound. Combined with standard bounds on the `∞-norm of a random
Gaussian vector, it gives Theorem 6 from the previous section.
Theorem 11. Let gn be any learning algorithm, i.e., a function from n samples in Rd × {±1} to a
binary classifier fn. Moreover, let σ > 0, let ε ≥ 0, and let θ ∈ Rd be drawn from N (0, I). We also
draw n samples from the (θ, σ)-Gaussian model. Then the expected `ε∞-robust classification error of
fn is at least
1
2
P
v∼N (0,I)
[√
n
σ2 + n
‖v‖∞ ≤ ε
]
.
Several remarks are in order. Since we lower bound the expected robust classification error for a
distribution over the model parameters θ?, our result implies a lower bound on the minimax robust
classification error (i.e., minimum over learning algorithms, maximum over unknown parameters θ?).
Second, while we refer to the learning procedure as an algorithm, our lower bounds are information
theoretic and hold irrespective of the computational power of this procedure.
Moreover, our proof shows that given the n samples, there is a single adversarial perturbation
that (a) applies to all learning algorithms, and (b) leads to at least a constant fraction of fresh
samples being misclassified. In other words, the same perturbation is transferable across examples as
well as across architectures and learning procedures. Hence our simple Gaussian data model already
exhibits the transferability phenomenon, which has recently received significant attention in the
deep learning literature (e.g., [35, 49, 52]).
We defer a full proof of the theorem to Section A.2 of the supplementary material. Here, we
sketch the main ideas of the proof.
We fix an algorithm gn and let Sn denote the set of n samples given to the algorithm. We are
interested in the expected robust classification error, which can be formalized as
Eθ∗ESnEy∼±1 Pr
x∼N (yθ∗,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y] .
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We swap the two outer expectations so the quantity of interest becomes
ESnEθ∗Ey∼±1 Pr
x∼N (yθ∗,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y] .
Given the samples Sn, the posterior on θ∗ is a Gaussian distribution with parameters defined by
simple statistics of Sn (the sample mean and the number of samples). Since the new data point x
(to be classified) is itself drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean θ∗, the posterior distribution
µ+ on the positive examples x ∼ N (θ∗, σ2) is another Gaussian with a certain mean z¯ and standard
deviation σ′. Similarly, the posterior distribution µ− on the negative examples is a Gaussian with
mean −z¯ and the same standard deviation σ′. At a high level, we will now argue that the adversary
can make the two posterior distributions µ− and µ+ similar enough so that the problem becomes
inherently noisy, preventing any classifier from achieving a high accuracy.
To this end, define the classification sets of fn as A+ = {x | fn(x) = +1} and A− = Rd \ A+.
This allows us to write the expected robust classification error as
ESnEθ∗
(
1
2
Pr
µ+
[Bε∞(A−)] +
1
2
Pr
µ−
[Bε∞(A+)]
)
.
We now lower bound the inner probabilities by considering the fixed perturbation ∆ = z. Note
that a point x ∼ µ+ is certainly misclassified if we have ‖∆‖∞ ≤ ε and x −∆ ∈ A−. Thus the
expected misclassification rate is at least µ+({x |x−∆ ∈ A−}) = µ+(A− + ∆).5 But since µ+ is
simply a translated version of N(0, σ′2), this implies that
Pr
µ+
[Bε∞(A−)] ≥ µ0(A− + ∆− z¯) = µ0(A−)
where the distribution µ0 is the centered Gaussian µ0 = N (0, σ′2). Similarly,
Pr
µ−
[Bε∞(A+)] ≥ µ0(A+ −∆ + z¯) = µ0(A+).
Since µ0(A−) + µ0(A+) = 1, this implies that the adversarial perturbation −z¯ misclassifies in
expectation half of the positively labeled examples, which completes the proof. As mentioned above,
the crucial step is that the posteriors µ+ and µ− are similar enough so that we can shift both to the
origin while still controlling the measure of the sets A− and A+.
4 Lower Bounds for the Bernoulli Model
For the Bernoulli model, our lower bound applies only to linear classifiers. As pointed out in Section
2.2, non-linear classifiers do not suffer an increase in sample complexity in this data model. We now
give a high-level overview of our proof that the sample complexity for learning a linear classifier
must increase as
n ≥ c ε
2d
log d
. (1)
At first, this lower bound may look stronger than in the Gaussian case, where Theorem 6
established a lower bound of the form ε
2
√
d
log d , i.e., with only a square root dependence on d. However,
5For a set A and a vector v, we use the notation A+ v to denote the set {x+ v : x ∈ A}.
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it is important to note that the relevant `∞-robustness scale for linear classifiers in the Bernoulli
model is on the order of Θ(τ), whereas non-linear classifiers can achieve robustness for noise level ε
up to 1. In particular, we prove that no linear classifier can achieve small `∞-robust classification
error for ε > 3τ (see Lemma 30 in Appendix B.2 for details). Recall that we focus on the τ = Θ(d−
1
4 )
regime. In this case, the lower bound in Equation 1 is on the order of
√
d samples, which is
comparable to the (nearly) tight bound for the Gaussian case. This is no coincidence: for our noise
parameters σ ≈ τ−1 ≈ d 14 , one can show that approximately σ2 = √d samples suffice to recover θ∗
to sufficiently good accuracy.
The point of start of our proof of the lower bound for linear classifiers is the following observation.
For an example (x, y), a linear classifier with parameter vector w robustly classifies the point x if
and only if
inf
∆:‖∆‖∞≤ε
〈yw, x+ ∆〉 > 0 ,
which is equivalent to
〈yw, x〉 > sup
∆:‖∆‖∞≤ε
〈yw,∆〉 .
By the definition of dual norms, the supremum on the right hand size is thus equal to ε‖yw‖1 = ε‖w‖1.
The learning algorithm infers the parameter vector w from a limited number of samples. Since
these samples are noisy copies of the unknown parameters θ?, the algorithm cannot be too certain
of any single bit in θ∗ (recall that we draw θ∗ uniformly from the hypercube). We formalize this
intuition in Lemma 29 (Appendix B.2) as a bound on the log odds given a sample S:
log
Pr[θ = +1 | S]
Pr[θ = −1 | S] .
Given such a bound, we can analyze the uncertainty in the estimate w by establishing an upper
bound on the posterior |E[θ?i |S]| for each i ∈ [d]. This in turn allow us to bound E[〈w, θ?〉|S]. With
control over this expectation, we can then relate the prediction 〈w, x〉 and the `1-norm ‖w‖1 via a
tail bound argument. We defer the details to Appendix B.2.
5 Experiments
We complement our theoretical results by performing experiments on multiple common datasets.
5.1 Experimental setup
We consider standard convolutional neural networks and train models on datasets of varying
complexity. Specifically, we study the MNIST [32], CIFAR-10 [31], and SVHN [38] datasets. The
latter is particularly well-suited for our analysis since it contains a large number of training images
(more than 600,000), allowing us to study adversarially robust generalization in the large dataset
regime.
Model architecture. For MNIST, we use the simple convolution architecture obtained from the
TensorFlow tutorial [50]. In order to prevent the model from overfitting when trained on small
data samples, we regularize the model by adding weight decay with parameter 0.5 to the training
loss. For CIFAR-10, we consider a standard ResNet model [21]. It has 4 groups of residual layers
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with filter sizes (16, 16, 32, 64) and 5 residual units each. On SVHN, we also trained a network of
larger capacity (filter sizes of (16, 64, 128, 256) instead of (16, 16, 32, 64)) in order to perform well
on the harder problems with larger adversarial perturbations. All of our models achieve close to
state-of-the-art performance on the respective benchmark.
Robust optimization. We perform robust optimization to train our classifiers. In particular, we
train against a projected gradient descent (PGD) adversary, starting from a random initial perturba-
tion of the training datapoint (see [34] for more details). We consider adversarial perturbations in
`∞ norm, performing PGD updates of the form
xt+1 = ΠBε∞(x0) (xt + λ · sgn(∇L(xt)))
for some step size λ. Here, L denotes the loss of the model, while ΠBr∞(x)(z) corresponds to projecting
z onto the `∞ ball of radius r around x. On MNIST, we perform 20 steps of PGD, while on CIFAR-10
and SVHN we perform 10 steps. We evaluate all networks against a 20-step PGD adversary. We
choose the PGD step size to be 2.5 · ε/k, where ε denotes the maximal allowed perturbation and k is
the total number of steps. This allows PGD to reach the boundary of the optimization region within
k
2.5 steps from any starting point.
5.2 Empirical sample complexity evaluation
We study how the generalization performance of adversarially robust networks varies with the size
of the training dataset. To do so, we train networks with a specific `∞ adversary (for some fixed
εtrain) while reducing the size of the training set. The training subsets are produced by randomly
sub-sampling the complete dataset in a class-balanced fashion. When increasing the number of
samples, we ensure that each dataset is a superset of the previous one.
We then evaluate the robustness of each trained network to perturbations of varying magnitude
(εtest). For each choice of training set size N and fixed attack εtest, we select the best performance
achieved across all hyperparameters settings (training perturbations εtrain and model size). On all
three datasets, we observed that the best natural accuracy is usually achieved for the naturally
trained network, while the best adversarial accuracy for almost all values of εtest was achieved when
training with the largest εtrain. We maximize over the hyperparameter settings since we are not
interested in the performance of a specific model, but rather in the inherent generalization properties
of the dataset independently of the classifier used. The results of these experiments are shown in
Figure 2 for each dataset.
The plots clearly demonstrate the need for more data to achieve adversarially robust generalization.
For any fixed test set accuracy, the number of samples needed is significantly higher for robust
generalization. In the SVHN experiments (where we have sufficient training samples to observe
plateauing behavior), the natural accuracy reaches its maximum with significantly fewer samples
than the adversarial accuracy. We report more details of our experiments in Section C of the
supplementary material.
5.3 Thresholding experiments
Motivated by our theoretical study of the Bernoulli model, we investigate whether thresholding can
also improve the sample complexity of robust generalization against an `∞ adversary on a real dataset.
MNIST is a natural candidate here since the images are nearly black-and-white and hence lie close
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Figure 2: Adversarially robust generalization performance as a function of training data size for
`∞ adversaries on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets. For each choice of training set size
and εtest, we plot the best performance achieved over εtrain and network capacity. This clearly
shows that achieving a certain level of adversarially robust generalization requires significantly more
samples than achieving the same level of standard generalization.
to vertices of a hypercube (as in the Bernoulli model). This is further motivated by experimental
evidence indicating that adversarially robust networks on MNIST learn such thresholding filters
when trained adversarially [34].
We repeat the sample complexity experiments performed in Section 5.2 with networks where
thresholding filters are explicitly encoded in the model. Here, we replace the first convolutional layer
with a fixed thresholding layer consisting of two channels, ReLU(x−εtrain) and ReLU(x−(1−εtrain)),
where x is the input image. Results from networks trained with this thresholding layer are shown
in Figure 3. For naturally trained networks, we use a value of ε = 0.1 for the thresholding filters,
whereas for adversarially trained networks we set ε = εtrain. For each data subset size and test
perturbation εtest, we plot the best test accuracy achieved over networks trained with different
thresholding filters, i.e., different values of ε. We separately show the effect of explicit thresholding
in such networks when they are trained naturally or adversarially using PGD. As predicted by our
theory, the networks achieve good adversarially robust generalization with significantly fewer samples
when thresholding filters are added. Further, note that adding a simple thresholding layer directly
yields nearly state-of-the-art robustness against moderately strong adversaries (ε = 0.1), without
any other modifications to the model architecture or training algorithm. It is also worth noting that
the thresholding filters could have been learned by the original network architecture, and that this
modification only decreases the capacity of the model. Our findings emphasize network architecture
as a crucial factor for learning adversarially robust networks from a limited number of samples.
We also experimented with thresholding filters on the CIFAR10 dataset, but did not observe any
significant difference from the standard architecture. This agrees with our theoretical understanding
that thresholding helps primarily in the case of (approximately) binary datasets.
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Figure 3: Adversarial robustness to `∞ attacks on the MNIST dataset for a simple convolution
network [34] with and without explicit thresholding filters. For each training set size choice and
εtest, we report the best test set accuracy achieved over choice of thresholding filters and εtrain. We
observe that introducing thresholding filters significantly reduces the number of samples needed to
achieve good adversarial generalization.
6 Related Work
Due to the large body of work on adversarial robustness, we focus on related papers that also provide
theoretical explanations for adversarial examples. Compared to prior work, the main difference of
our approach is the focus on generalization. Most related papers study robustness either without
the learning context, or in the limit as the number of samples approaches infinity. As a result,
finite sample phenomena do not arise in these theoretical approaches. As we have seen in Figure
1, adversarial examples are currently a failure of generalization from a limited training set. Hence
we believe that studying robust generalization is an insightful avenue for understanding adversarial
examples.
• Wang, Jha, and Chaudhuri [54] study the adversarial robustness of nearest neighbor classifiers. In
contrast to our work, the authors give theoretical guarantees for a specific classification algorithm.
We focus on the inherent sample complexity of adversarially robust generalization independently
of the learning method. Moreover, our results hold for finite sample sizes while the results in [54]
are only asymptotic.
• Recent work by Gilmer et al. [18] explores a specific distribution where robust learning is
empirically difficult with overparametrized neural networks.6 The main phenomenon is that even
a small natural error rate on their dataset translates to a large adversarial error rate. Our results
give a more nuanced picture that involves the sample complexity required for generalization. In
our data models, it is possible to achieve an error rate that is essentially zero by using a very
small number of samples, whereas the adversarial error rate is still large unless we have seen a lot
of samples.
• Fawzi, Moosavi-Dezfooli, and Frossard [17] relate the robustness of linear and non-linear classifiers
6It is worth noting that the distribution in [18] has only one degree of freedom. Hence we conjecture that the observed
difficulty of robust learning in their setup is due to the chosen model class and not due to an information-theoretic
limit as in our work.
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to adversarial and (semi-)random perturbations. Their work studies the setting where the
classifier is fixed and does not encompass the learning task. We focus on generalization aspects of
adversarial robustness and provide upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity. Overall,
we argue that adversarial examples are inherent to the statistical setup and not necessarily a
consequence of a concrete classifier model.
• The work of Xu, Caramanis, and Mannor [56] establishes a connection between robust optimization
and regularization for linear classification. In particular, they show that robustness to a specific
perturbation set is exactly equivalent to the standard support vector machine. The authors
give asymptotic consistency results under a robustness condition, but do not provide any finite
sample guarantees. In contrast, our work considers specific distributional models where we can
demonstrate a clear gap between robust and standard generalization.
• Papernot et al. [40] discuss adversarial robustness at the population level. They assume the
existence of an adversary that can significantly increase the loss for any hypothesis in the
hypothesis class. By definition, robustness against adversarial perturbations is impossible in this
regime. As demonstrated in Figure 1, we instead conjecture that current classification models
are not robust to adversarial examples because they fail to generalize. Hence our results concern
generalization from a finite number of samples. We show that even when the hypothesis class
is large enough to achieve good robust classification error, the sample complexity of robust
generalization can still be significantly bigger than that of standard generalization.
• In a recent paper, Fawzi, Fawzi, and Fawzi [16] also give provable lower bounds for adversarial
robustness. There are several important differences between their work and ours. At a high level,
the results in [16] state that there are fundamental limits for adversarial robustness that apply
to any classifier. As pointed out by the authors, their bounds also apply to the human visual
system. However, an important aspect of adversarial examples is that they often fool current
classifiers, yet are still easy to recognize for humans. Hence we believe that the approach in [16]
does not capture the underlying phenomenon since it does not distinguish between the robustness
of current artificial classifiers and the human visual system.
Moreover, the lower bounds in [16] do not involve the training data and consequently apply in
the limit where an infinite number of samples is available. In contrast, our work investigates how
the amount of available training data affects adversarial robustness. As we have seen in Figure 1,
adversarial robustness is currently an issue of generalization. In particular, we can train classifiers
that achieve a high level of robustness on the CIFAR10 training set, but this robustness does not
transfer to the test set. Therefore, our perspective based on adversarially robust generalization
more accurately reflects the current challenges in training robust classifiers.
Finally, Fawzi, Fawzi, and Fawzi [16] utilize the notion of a latent space for the data distribution
in order to establish lower bounds that apply to any classifier. While the existence of generative
models such as GANs provides empirical evidence for this assumption, we note that it does
not suffice to accurately describe the robustness phenomenon. For instance, there are multiple
generative models that produce high-quality samples for the MNIST dataset, yet there are now
also several successful defenses against adversarial examples on MNIST. As we have shown in our
work, the fine-grained properties of the data distribution can have significant impact on how hard
it is to learn a robust classifier.
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Margin-based theory. There is a long line of work in machine learning on exploring the connection
between various notions of margin and generalization, e.g., see [44] and references therein. In this
setting, the `p margin, i.e., how robustly classifiable the data is for `∗p-bounded classifiers, enables
dimension-independent control of the sample complexity. However, the sample complexity in concrete
distributional models can often be significantly smaller than what the margin implies. As we will see
next, standard margin-based bounds do not suffice to demonstrate a gap between robust and benign
generalization for the distributional models studied in our work.
First, we briefly remind the reader about standard margin-based results (see Theorem 15.4 in
[44] for details). For a dataset that has bounded `2 norm ρ and `2 margin γ, the classification error
of the hard-margin SVM scales as √
(ρ/γ)2
n
where n is the number of samples. To illustrate this bound, consider the Gaussian model in the
regime σ = Θ(d1/4) where a single sample suffices to learn a classifier with low error (see Theorem 4).
The standard bound on the norm of an i.i.d. Gaussian vector shows that we have a data norm bound
ρ = Θ(d3/4) with high probability. While the Gaussian model is not strictly separable in any regime,
we can still consider the probability that a sample achieves at least a certain margin:
P
z∼N (0,σ2I)
[〈z, θ?〉
‖θ?‖2
≥ ρ
]
≥ 1− δ .
A simple calculation shows that for ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d (as in our earlier bounds), the Gaussian model does
not achieve margin γ ≥ √d even at the quantile δ = 1/2. Hence the margin-based bound would
indicate a sample complexity of Ω(d1/4) already for standard generalization, which obscures the
dichotomy between standard and robust sample complexity.
Robust statistics. An orthogonal line of work in robust statistics studies robustness of estimators
to corruption of training data [25]. This notion of robustness, while also important, is not directly
relevant to the questions addressed in our work.
7 Discussion and Future Directions
The vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial perturbations has recently been a source of
much discussion and is still poorly understood. Different works have argued that this vulnerability
stems from their discontinuous nature [49], their linear nature [19], or is a result of high-dimensional
geometry and independent of the model class [18]. Our work gives a more nuanced picture. We
show that for a natural data distribution (the Gaussian model), the model class we train does not
matter and a standard linear classifier achieves optimal robustness. However, robustness also strongly
depends on properties of the underlying data distribution. For other data models (such as MNIST
or the Bernoulli model), our results demonstrate that non-linearities are indispensable to learn from
few samples. This dichotomy provides evidence that defenses against adversarial examples need to
be tailored to the specific dataset and hence may be more complicated than a single, broad approach.
Understanding the interactions between robustness, classifier model, and data distribution from the
perspective of generalization is an important direction for future work.
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What do our results mean for robust classification of real images? Our Gaussian lower bound
implies that if an algorithm works for all (or most) settings of the unknown parameter θ?, then
achieving strong `∞-robustness requires a sample complexity increase that is polynomial in the
dimension. There are a few different ways this lower bound could be bypassed. After all, it is
conceivable that the noise scale σ is significantly smaller for real image datasets, making robust
classification easier. And even if that was not the case, a good algorithm could work for the
parameters θ? that correspond to real datasets while not working for most other parameters. To
accomplish this, the algorithm would implicitly or explicitly have prior information about the
correct θ?. While some prior information is already incorporated in the model architectures (e.g.,
convolutional and pooling layers), the conventional wisdom is often not to bias the neural network
with our priors. Our work suggests that there are trade-offs with robustness here and that adding
more prior information could help to learn more robust classifiers.
The focus of our paper is on adversarial perturbations in a setting where the test distribution
(before the adversary’s action) is the same as the training distribution. While this is a natural
scenario from a security point of view, other setups can be more relevant in different robustness
contexts. For instance, we may want a classifier that is robust to small changes between the training
and test distribution. This can be formalized as the classification accuracy on unperturbed examples
coming from an adversarially modified distribution. Here, the power of the adversary is limited
by how much the test distribution can be modified, and the adversary is not allowed to perturb
individual samples coming from the modified test distribution. Interestingly, our lower bound for the
Gaussian model also applies to such worst-case distributional shifts. In particular, if the adversary
is allowed to shift the mean θ? by a vector in Bε∞, our proof sketched in Section 3 transfers to the
distribution shift setting. Since the lower bound relies only on a single universal perturbation, this
perturbation can also be applied directly to the mean vector.
Future directions. Several questions remain. We now provide a list of concrete directions for
future work on robust generalization.
Stronger lower bounds. An interesting aspect of adversarial examples is that the adversary
can often fool the classifier on most inputs [11, 49]. While our results show a lower bound
for classification error 1/2, it is conceivable that misclassification rates much closer to 1 are
unavoidable for at least one of the two classes (or equivalently, when the adversary is allowed
to pick the class label). In order to avoid degenerate cases such as achieving robustness by
being the constant classifier, it would be interesting to study regimes where the classifier has
high standard accuracy but does not achieve robustness yet. In such a regime, does good
standard accuracy imply that the classifier is vulnerable to adversarial perturbations on almost
all inputs?
Different perturbation sets. Depending on the problem setting, different perturbation sets are
relevant. Due to the large amount of empirical work on `∞ robustness, our paper has focused
on such perturbations. From a security point of view, we want to defend against perturbations
that are imperceptible to humans. While this is not a well-defined concept, the class of small
`∞-norm perturbations should be contained in any reasonable definition of imperceptible
perturbations. However, changes in different `p norms [11, 36, 49], sparse perturbations [10,
37, 39, 48], or mild spatial transformations can also be imperceptible to a human [55]. In
less adversarial settings, more constrained and lower-dimensional perturbations such as small
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rotations and translations may be more appropriate [15]. Overall, understanding the sample
complexity implications of different perturbation sets is an important direction for future work.
Further notions of test time robustness. As mentioned above, less adversarial forms of robust-
ness may be better suited to model challenges arising outside security. How much easier is
it to learn a robust classifier in more benign settings? This question is naturally related to
problems such as transfer learning and domain adaptation.
Broader classes of distributions. Our results directly apply to two concrete distributional mod-
els. While the results already show interesting phenomena and are predictive of behavior on
real data, understanding the robustness properties for a broader class of distributions is an
important direction for future work. Moreover, it would be useful to understand what general
properties of distributions make robust generalization hard or easy.
Wider sample complexity separations. In our work, we show a separation of
√
d between the
standard and robust sample complexity for the Gaussian model. It is open whether larger gaps
are possible. Note that for large adversarial perturbations, the data may no longer be robustly
separable which leads to trivial gaps in sample complexity, simply because the harder robust
generalization problem is impossible to solve. Hence this question is mainly interesting in the
regime where a robust classifier exists in the model class of interest.
Robustness in the PAC model. Our focus has been on robust learning for specific distributions
without any limitations on the hypothesis class. A natural dual perspective is to investigate
robust learning for specific hypothesis classes, as in the probably approximately correct (PAC)
framework. For instance, it is well known that the sample complexity of learning a half space
in d dimensions is O(d). Does this sample complexity also suffice to learn in the presence of an
adversary at test time? While robustness to adversarial training noise has been studied in the
PAC setting (e.g., see [7, 27, 28]), we are not aware of similar work on test time robustness.
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A Omitted proofs for the Gaussian model
A.1 Upper bounds
We begin with standard results about (sub)-Gaussian concentration in Fact 12 and Lemmas 13
to 16. These results show that a class-weighted average of sufficiently many samples from the
Gaussian model achieves a large inner product with the unknown mean vector. Lemma 17 then
relates the inner product between a linear classifier and the mean vector to the classification accuracy.
Theorem 18 uses the lemmas to establish our main theorem for standard generalization. Corollary
19 instantiates the bound for learning from one sample. After further simplification, this yields
Theorem 4 from the main text.
For robust generalization, we first relate the inner product between a linear classifier and the
unknown mean vector to the robust classification accuracy in Lemma 20. Similar to the standard
classification error, Theorem 21 and Corollary 22 then yield our upper bounds for robust generalization.
Simplifying Corollary 22 further gives Theorem 5 from the main text.
Fact 12. Let z ∈ Rd be drawn from a centered spherical Gaussian, i.e., z ∼ Nd(0, σ2I) where σ > 0.
Then we have P[‖z‖2 ≥ σ
√
d+ t] ≤ e−t2/(2σ2) .
Proof. We refer the reader to Example 5.7 in [6] for a reference of this standard result. Combined
with E[‖z‖2] ≤ σ
√
d, which is obtained from Jensen’s Inequality, the aforementioned example gives
the desired upper tail bound.
Lemma 13. Let z1, . . . , zn ∈ Rd be drawn i.i.d. from a spherical Gaussian, i.e., zi ∼ Nd(µ, σ2I)
where µ ∈ Rd and σ > 0. Let z ∈ Rd be the sample mean vector z = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi. Finally, let δ > 0 be
the target probability. Then we have
P
‖z‖2 ≥ ‖µ‖2 + σ
(√
d+
√
2 log 1/δ
)
√
n
 ≤ δ .
Proof. Since each zi has the same distribution as µ + gi for gi ∼ Nd(0, σ2I), we can bound the
desired tail probability for
z =
1
n
n∑
i=1
µ+ gi
= µ+
1
n
n∑
i=1
gi .
Morever, the average of the gi has the same distribution as g ∼ Nd(0, σ2n I). Hence it suffices to
bound the tail of ‖µ+ g‖2. For any c ≥ 0, applying the triangle inequality then gives
P[‖z‖2 ≥ ‖µ‖2 + c] = P[‖µ+ g‖2 ≥ ‖µ‖2 + c]
≤ P[‖g‖2 ≥ c] .
Setting c = σ
√
d/n + t with
t = σ
√
2 log 1/δ
n
and substituting into Fact 12 then gives the desired result.
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For convenient use in our later theorems, we instantiate Lemma 13 with the parameters most
relevant for our Gaussian model. In particular, the norm of the mean vector µ is
√
d and we are
interested in up to exponentially small failure probability δ (but not necessarily smaller).
Lemma 14. Let z1, . . . , zn ∈ Rd be drawn i.i.d. from a spherical Gaussian with mean norm
√
d,
i.e., zi ∼ Nd(µ, σ2I) where µ ∈ Rd, ‖µ‖2 =
√
d, and σ > 0. Let z ∈ Rd be the sample mean vector
z = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi. Then we have
P
[
‖z‖2 ≥
(
1 +
2σ√
n
)√
d
]
≤ e−d/2 .
Proof. We substitute into Lemma 13 with ‖µ‖2 =
√
d and
√
2 log 1/δ =
√
d.
Lemma 15. Let z1, . . . , zn ∈ Rd be drawn i.i.d. from a spherical Gaussian, i.e., zi ∼ Nd(µ, σ2I)
where µ ∈ Rd and σ > 0. Let z ∈ Rd be the mean vector z = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi. Finally, let δ > 0 be the
target probability. Then we have
P
[
〈z, µ〉 ≤ ‖µ‖22 − σ‖µ‖2
√
2 log 1/δ
n
]
≤ δ .
Proof. As in Lemma 13, we use the fact that z has the same distribution as µ+g where g ∼ Nd(0, σ2n I).
For any t ≥ 0, this allows us to simplify the tail event to
P
[
〈z, µ〉 ≤ ‖µ‖22 − t
]
= P[〈g, µ〉 ≤ −t] .
The right hand side can now be simplified to P[h ≥ t] where h ∼ N (0, σ2‖µ‖22/n). Invoking the
standard sub-Gaussian tail bound
P[h ≥ t] ≤ exp
(
− n · t
2
2σ2‖µ‖22
)
and substituting t = σ‖µ‖2
√
2 log 1/δ
n then gives the desired result.
Lemma 16. Let z1, . . . , zn ∈ Rd be drawn i.i.d. from a spherical Gaussian with mean norm
√
d,
i.e., zi ∼ Nd(µ, σ2I) where µ ∈ Rd, ‖µ‖2 =
√
d, and σ > 0. Let z ∈ Rd be the sample mean vector
z = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi and let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector in the direction of z, i.e., ŵ = z/‖z‖2. Then we have
P
[
〈ŵ, µ〉 ≤ 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
√
d
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− d
8(σ2 + 1)
)
.
Proof. We invoke Lemma 14, which yields
‖z‖2 ≤
(
1 +
2σ√
n
)√
d
with probability 1− e− d/2. Moreover, we invoke Lemma 15 with δ = e− d/8σ2 and ‖µ‖2 =
√
d to get
〈z, µ〉 ≥ d− d
2
√
n
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with probability 1− e− d/8σ2 . We continue under both events, which yields the desired overall failure
probability 2e− d/2.
We now have
〈ŵ, µ〉 = 〈z, µ〉‖z‖2
≥
(
1− 1
2
√
n
)
d
‖z‖2
≥
(
1− 1
2
√
n
)
d
(1 + 2σ√
n
)
√
d
=
2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
√
d
as stated in the lemma.
Lemma 17. Let z ∈ Rd be drawn from a spherical Gaussian, i.e., z ∼ Nd(µ, σ2I) where µ ∈ Rd and
σ > 0. Moreover, let w ∈ Rd be an arbitrary unit vector with 〈w, µ〉 ≥ ρ where ρ ≥ 0. Then we have
P[〈w, z〉 ≤ ρ] ≤ exp
(
−(〈w, µ〉 − ρ)
2
2σ2
)
.
Proof. Since z has the same distribution as µ+ g where g ∼ Nd(0, σ2I), we can bound the tail event
as
P[〈w, z〉 ≤ ρ] = P[〈w, µ+ g〉 ≤ ρ]
= P[〈w, g〉 ≤ ρ− 〈w, µ〉] .
The inner product 〈w, g〉 is distributed as a univariate normal N (0, σ2) because the vector w has
unit norm. Hence we can invoke the standard sub-Gaussian tail bound to get the desired tail
probability.
Theorem 18 (Standard generalization in the Gaussian model.). Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ Rd ×
{±1} be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector
in the direction of z = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi, i.e., ŵ = z/‖z‖2. Then with probability at least 1−2 exp(− d8(σ2+1)),
the linear classifier fŵ has classification error at most
exp
(
− (2
√
n− 1)2d
2(2
√
n+ 4σ)2σ2
)
.
Proof. Let zi = yi · xi and note that each zi is independent and has distribution Nd(θ?, σ2I). Hence
we can invoke Lemma 16 and get
〈ŵ, θ?〉 ≥ 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
√
d
with probability at least 1− 2 exp(− d
8(σ2+1)
) as stated in the theorem.
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Next, unwrapping the definition of fŵ allows us to write the classification error of fŵ as
P[fŵ(x) 6= y] = P[〈ŵ, θ?〉 ≤ 0] .
Invoking Lemma 17 with ρ = 0 then gives the desired bound.
Corollary 19 (Generalization from a single sample.). Let (x, y) be drawn from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian
model with
σ ≤ d
1/4
5
√
log 1/β
.
Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector ŵ = yx‖x‖2 . Then with probability at least 1− 2 exp(−
d
8(σ2+1)
), the linear
classifier fŵ has classification error at most β.
Proof. Invoking Theorem 18 with n = 1 gives a classification error bound of
β′ = exp
(
− d
2(2 + 4σ)2σ2
)
.
It remains to show that β′ ≤ β.
We now bound the denominator in β′. First, we have
2 + 4σ ≤ 2d1/4 + 4
5
d
1/4
≤ 3d1/4 .
Next, we bound the entire denominator as
2(2 + 4σ)2σ2 ≤ 2 · 9
√
d ·
√
d
25 log 1/β
≤ d
log 1/β
which yields the desired classification error when substituted back into β′.
Lemma 20. Assume a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model. Let p ≥ 1, ε ≥ 0 be robustness parameters, and let
ŵ be a unit vector such that 〈ŵ, θ?〉 ≥ ε‖ŵ‖∗p., where ‖·‖∗p is the dual norm of ‖·‖p. Then the linear
classifier fŵ has `εp-robust classification error at most
exp
(
−(〈ŵ, θ
?〉 − ε‖ŵ‖∗p)2
2σ2
)
.
Proof. Per Definition 3, we have to upper bound the quantity
P
(x,y)∼P
[∃x′ ∈ B(x) : fŵ(x′) 6= y] .
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For linear classifiers, we can rewrite this event as follows:
P
(x,y)∼P
[∃x′ ∈ Bεp(x) : fŵ(x′) 6= y] = P
(x,y)∼P
[∃x′ ∈ Bεp(x) : 〈y · x′, ŵ〉 ≤ 0]
= P
(x,y)∼P
[∃∆ ∈ Bεp(0) : 〈y · (x+ ∆), ŵ〉 ≤ 0]
= P
(x,y)∼P
[
min
∆∈Bεp(0)
〈y · (x+ ∆), ŵ〉 ≤ 0
]
= P
(x,y)∼P
[
〈y · x, ŵ〉+ min
∆∈Bεp(0)
〈y ·∆, ŵ〉 ≤ 0
]
.
We now use the definition of the dual norm. Note that for any ∆ ∈ Bεp, we also have −∆ ∈ Bεp. Since
y ∈ {±1}, we can drop the y factor. Overall, we get
P
(x,y)∼P
[
〈y · x, ŵ〉+ min
∆∈Bεp(0)
〈y ·∆, ŵ〉 ≤ 0
]
= P
(x,y)∼P
[
〈y · x, ŵ〉 − ε‖ŵ‖∗p ≤ 0
]
= P
(x,y)∼P
[
〈y · x, ŵ〉 ≤ ε‖ŵ‖∗p
]
.
By assumption in the lemma, we have 〈ŵ, θ?〉 ≥ ε‖ŵ‖∗p. Hence we can invoke Lemma 17 with µ = θ?
and ρ = ε‖ŵ‖∗p to get the desired bound on the robust classification error.
Theorem 21. Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ Rd × {±1} be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model
with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector in the direction of z = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi, i.e., ŵ = z/‖z‖2.
Then with probability at least 1− 2 exp(− d
8(σ2+1)
), the linear classifier fŵ has `ε∞-robust classification
error at most β if
ε ≤ 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
− σ
√
2 log 1/β√
d
.
Proof. Let zi = yi · xi and note that each zi is independent and has distribution Nd(θ?, σ2I). Hence
we can invoke Lemma 16 and get
〈ŵ, θ?〉 ≥ 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
√
d
with probability at least 1− 2 exp(− d
8(σ2+1)
) as stated in the theorem.
Since ‖ŵ‖2 = 1, we have ‖ŵ‖∗∞ = ‖ŵ‖1 ≤
√
d. The bound on ε in the theorem allows us to
invoke Lemma 20. This yields an `ε2-robust classification error of at most
exp
(
−(〈ŵ, θ
?〉 − ε√d)2
2σ2
)
.
Since
〈ŵ, θ?〉 − ε‖ŵ‖∗p ≥
2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
√
d−
√
d
(
2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
− σ
√
2 log 1/β√
d
)
this simplifies to the robust classification error stated in the theorem.
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Corollary 22. Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ Rd × {±1} be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model
with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d and σ ≤ 132d1/4. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector in the direction of z = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi,
i.e., ŵ = z/‖z‖
2
. Then with probability at least 1 − 2 exp(− d
8(σ2+1)
), the linear classifier fŵ has
`ε∞-robust classification error at most 0.01 if
n ≥
{
1 for ε ≤ 14d−1/4
64 ε2
√
d for 14d
−1/4 ≤ ε ≤ 14
.
Proof. We begin by invoking Theorem 21, which gives a `ε′∞-robust classification error at most
β = 0.01 for
ε′ =
2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
− σ
√
2 log 1/β√
d
≥ 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 18d
1/4
− 1
8d1/4
.
First, we consider the case where ε ≤ 14d−1/4. Using n = 1, the resulting robustness is
ε′ ≥ 1
2 + 18d
1/4
− 1
8d1/4
≥ 1
(2 + 18)d
1/4
− 1
8d1/4
≥ 1
4
d−1/4
≥ ε
as required.
Next, we consider the case 14d
−1/4 ≤ ε ≤ 14 . Substituting n = 64ε2
√
d, we get
ε′ ≥ 16εd
1/4 − 1
16εd1/4 + 18d
1/4
− 1
8d1/4
≥ 12εd
1/4
4d1/4 + 18d
1/4
− 1
8d1/4
≥ 12
5
ε− 1
2
ε
≥ ε
which completes the proof.
A.2 Lower bound
The following theorem is our main lower bound for the Gaussian model. To make the lower bound
easily comparable to Corollary 22 on the upper bound side, we simplify the lower bound in Corollary
23 and bring it into a similar form.
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Theorem 11. Let gn be any learning algorithm, i.e., a function from n samples in Rd × {±1} to a
binary classifier fn. Moreover, let σ > 0, let ε ≥ 0, and let θ ∈ Rd be drawn from N (0, I). We also
draw n samples from the (θ, σ)-Gaussian model. Then the expected `ε∞-robust classification error of
fn is at least
1
2
P
v∼N (0,I)
[√
n
σ2 + n
‖v‖∞ ≤ ε
]
.
Proof. We begin by formally stating the expected `ε∞-robust classification error of fn:
Ξ = E
θ∼N (0,I)
 E
y1,...,yn∼R
 E
x1,...,xn
∼N (yiθ,σ2I)
[
E
y∼R
[
P
x∼N (yθ,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y]
]]
where it is important to note that fn = gn((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) depends on the samples (xi, yi) but
not on θ. This will allow us to re-arrange the above expectations in a crucial way.
We first rewrite the expectations by noting that we can sample zi ∼ N (θ, σ2I) without condi-
tioning on the class yi by then setting fn = gn((y1z1, y1), . . . , (ynzn, yn)). This yields
Ξ = E
θ∼N (0,I)
 E
y1,...,yn∼R
 E
z1,...,zn
∼N (θ,σ2I)
[
E
y∼R
[
P
x∼N (yθ,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y]
]]
= E
y1,...,yn∼R
 E
θ∼N (0,I)
 E
z1,...,zn
∼N (θ,σ2I)
[
E
y∼R
[
P
x∼N (yθ,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y]
]]
where in the second line we moved the expectation over the class labels to the outside.
Next, we will swap the order of the expectations over the mean parameter θ and the conditional
samples xi. Since the posterior distribution for a Gaussian prior and likelihood is also Gaussian, the
conditional distribution of θ given the zi is a multivariate Gaussian with parameters
µ′ =
n
σ2 + n
z
Σ′ =
σ2
σ2 + n
I
where z =
∑n
i=1 zi. Moreover, letM be the marginal distribution over (zi, . . . , zn) after integrating
over θ (which we will analyze later). Then we get
Ξ = E
y1,...,yn∼R
 E(z1,...,zn)∼M
 Eθ∼N (µ′,Σ′)
[
E
y∼R
[
P
x∼N (yθ,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y]
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Ψ

 (2)
We now bound the term Ψ. Since the inner events only depends on θ through x, we can combine
the Gaussian expectation with the Gaussian probability after moving the expectation over the label
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y to the outside. This gives
Ψ = E
θ∼N (µ′,Σ′)
[
E
y∼R
[
P
x∼N (yθ,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y]
]]
= E
y∼R
[
E
θ∼N (µ′,Σ′)
[
P
x∼N (yθ,σ2I)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y]
]]
= E
y∼R
[
P
x∼N (yµ′,Σ′′)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= y]
]
(3)
where Σ′′ = Σ′ + σ2I.
Next, we bound the y = +1 case in the expectation over y. The y = −1 case can be handled
exactly analogously. We introduce the set A− ⊆ Rd as the set of inputs on which the classifier
fn returns −1, i.e., A− = {x | fn(x) = −1}. Note that we can treat A− as fixed here since it only
depends on the samples zi and labels yi but not on the parameter θ or the new sample x. This
allows us to rewrite the first event as
{x | ∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= +1} = {x | ∃x′ ∈ A− : ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ ε}
= Bε∞(A−) .
Now, note that as long as ‖µ′‖∞ ≤ ε, the set Bε∞(A−) contains a copy of A− shifted by ±µ′. Hence
we have
P
x∼N (µ′,Σ′′)
[∃x′ ∈ Bε∞(x) : fn(x′) 6= +1] = PN (µ′,Σ′′)[Bε∞(A−)]
≥ I[‖µ′‖∞ ≤ ε] · PN (0,Σ′′)[A−]
Repeating the same argument for the y = −1 case and substituting back into Equation (3) yields
Ψ ≥ E
y∼R
[
I
[‖µ′‖∞ ≤ ε] · PN (0,Σ′′)[A−sgn(y)]
]
= I
[‖µ′‖∞ ≤ ε] · 12
(
P
N (0,Σ′′)
[A−] + P
N (0,Σ′′)
[A+]
)
=
1
2
I
[‖µ′‖∞ ≤ ε] .
In the last line, we used that the sets two sets A− and A+ are complements of each other and hence
their total mass under the measure N (0,Σ′′) is 1.
Substituting back into Equation (2) yields
Ξ ≥ E
y1,...,yn∼R
[
E
(z1,...,zn)∼M
[
1
2
I
[‖µ′‖∞ ≤ ε]]
]
=
1
2
E
(z1,...,zn)∼M
[
I
[‖µ′‖∞ ≤ ε]]
=
1
2
P
(z1,...,zn)∼M
[
n
σ2 + n
‖z‖∞ ≤ ε
]
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where we dropped the expectation over the labels yi since the inner expression is now independent
of the labels.
It remains to analyze the distribution of the vector z. Note that conditioned on a vector
θ2 ∼ Nd(0, I), the distribution of each zi is N (θ2, σ2I). Hence the conditional distribution of z given
θ2 is N (θ2, σ2n I) and integrating over θ2 yields a marginal distribution of N (0, (1 + σ
2
n )I). Overall,
this gives
Ξ ≥ 1
2
P
θ2∼N (0,(1+σ2n )I)
[
n
σ2 + n
‖θ2‖∞ ≤ ε
]
=
1
2
P
θ2∼N (0,I)
[√
n
σ2 + n
‖θ2‖∞ ≤ ε
]
where we used
n
σ2 + n
√
1 +
σ2
n
=
√
n
σ2 + n
.
Rearranging this inequality yields the statement of the theorem.
Corollary 23. Let gn be any learning algorithm, i.e., a function from n ≥ 0 samples in Rd × {±1}
to a binary classifier fn. Moreover, let σ > 0, let ε ≥ 0, and let θ ∈ Rd be drawn from N (0, I). We
also draw n samples from the (θ, σ)-Gaussian model. Then the expected `ε∞-robust classification error
of fn is at least (1− 1/d)12 if
n ≤ ε
2σ2
8 log d
.
Proof. We have √
n
σ2 + n
≤
√
ε2σ2
8σ2 log d
=
ε
2
√
2 log d
.
Hence we get
P
v∼N (0,I)
[√
n
σ2 + n
‖v‖∞ ≤ ε
]
≥ P
v∼N (0,I)
[√
ε
2
√
2 log d
‖v‖∞ ≤ ε
]
= P
v∼N (0,I)
[
‖v‖∞ ≤ 2
√
2 log d
]
.
Standard concentration results for the maximum of d i.i.d. Gaussians (e.g., see Theorem 5.8 in [6])
now imply that the above probability is at least (1− 1/d). Invoking into Theorem 11 then completes
the proof of this corollary.
B Omitted proofs for the Bernoulli model
B.1 Upper bounds
As in the Gaussian case, our upper bounds rely on standard sub-Gaussian concentration. Lemmas
24 and 25 provide lower bounds on the inner product between a single sample from the Bernoulli
model and the unknown parameter vectors. Lemma 26 then relates the inner product between a
linear classifier and the unknown mean vector to the classification accuracy. Combining these results
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yields Theorem 27 for generalization from a single sample. Simplifying this theorem yields Corollary
28, which directly implies Theorem 8 from the main text.
Lemma 24. Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1} be a sample drawn from a (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model and let
z = xy. Let δ > 0 be the target probability. Then we have
P
[
〈z, θ?〉 ≤ 2τd−
√
2d log 1/δ
]
≤ δ .
Proof. To center z, we define g = z − E[z] = z − 2τθ?, where each coordinate of g has zero mean.
Then, we can write
〈z, θ?〉 = 〈g + 2τθ?, θ?〉 = 〈g, θ?〉+ 2τd .
Hence for all t > 0 we have,
P[〈z, θ?〉 ≤ 2τd− t ] = P[〈g, θ?〉 ≤ −t ] .
Note that g = (g1, g2, ..., gd) is a vector of sub-Gaussian random variables since each entry is bounded,
i.e., each gj (like zj) lies in an interval of length 2. Hence, the sub-Gaussian parameter of each gj is
1. Invoking Corollary 1.7 from Rigollet and Hütter [43] for the weighted combination of independent
sub-Gaussian random variables, we get that
P
 d∑
j=1
gjθ
?
j ≤ −t
 ≤ exp(− t2
2||θ?||22
)
.
Since ‖θ?‖22 = d, we can simplify the tail event
P[〈z, θ?〉 ≤ 2τd− t] ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2d
)
which then gives
P
[
〈z, θ?〉 ≤ 2τd−
√
2d log 1/δ
]
≤ δ
as desired.
Lemma 25. Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1} be a sample drawn from a (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model and let
z = xy. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector in the direction of z, i.e., ŵ = z/‖z‖
2
. Then we have
P
[
〈ŵ, θ?〉 ≤ τ
√
d
]
≤ exp
(
−τ
2d
2
)
.
Proof. We know that
‖z‖2 =
√
d .
Moreover, we invoke Lemma 24 with δ = exp(− τ2d2 ) to get
〈z, θ?〉 ≤ τd
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with probability δ. We now have
〈ŵ, θ?〉 = 〈z, θ
?〉
‖z‖2
≤ τd√
d
with probability δ as stated in the lemma.
Lemma 26. Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1} be a sample drawn from a (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model and let
z = xy. Moreover, let w ∈ Rd be an arbitrary unit vector with 〈w, 2τθ?〉 ≥ 0. Then we have
P[〈w, z〉 ≤ 0] ≤ exp
(
−2τ2〈w, θ?〉2
)
.
Proof. As in Lemma 24, we center z = 2τθ? + g, where g is a vector of zero-mean sub-Gaussian
random variables. We can bound the tail event as
P[〈w, z〉 ≤ 0] = P[〈w, 2τθ? + g〉 ≤ 0]
= P[〈w, g〉 ≤ −〈w, 2τθ?〉] .
We know that the sub-Gaussian parameter of each gj is 1 as discussed in Lemma 24. Hence, invoking
Corollary 1.7 from Rigollet and Hütter [43] for the weighted combination of independent sub-gaussian
random variables, we get that
P
 d∑
j=1
gjwj ≤ −t
 ≤ exp(− t2
2||w||22
)
= exp
(
− t
2
2
)
.
Thus,
P[〈w, g〉 ≤ −〈w, 2τθ?〉] ≤ exp
(
−〈w, 2τθ
?〉2
2
)
as desired in the lemma.
Theorem 27 (Standard generalization in the Bernoulli model.). Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1} be drawn
from a (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model. Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector in the direction of z = yx, i.e.,
ŵ = z/‖z‖
2
. Then with probability at least 1− exp(− τ2d2 ), the linear classifier fŵ has classification
error at most exp
(−2τ4d).
Proof. We invoke Lemma 25 to get
〈ŵ, θ?〉 ≥ τ
√
d
with probability at least 1− exp(− τ2d2 ) as stated in the theorem. Next, unwrapping the definition of
fŵ allows us to write the classification error of fŵ as
P[fŵ(x) 6= y] = P[〈ŵ, z〉 ≤ 0] .
Invoking Lemma 26 then gives the desired bound.
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Corollary 28 (Generalization from a single sample.). Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1} be drawn from a
(θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model with
τ ≥
(
log 1/β
2d
)1/4
.
Let ŵ ∈ Rd be the unit vector ŵ = yx‖x‖2 . Then with probability at least 1 − exp(−
τ2d
2 ), the linear
classifier fŵ has classification error at most β.
Proof. Invoking Theorem 27 gives a classification error bound of
β′ = exp
(−2τ4d) .
It remains to show that β′ ≤ β. Now,
log 1/β′ = 2τ4d
≥ 2 · log
1/β
2d
· d
≥ log 1/β
which yields the desired bound.
B.2 Lower bounds
In this section, we show that any linear classifier for the (θ∗, τ)-Bernoulli model requires many
samples to be robust. The main result is formalized in Theorem 31, which can be simplified to yield
Theorem 9 from the main text. Before we proceed to the main theorem, we first prove a simple but
useful lemma.
Lemma 29. Let θ be drawn uniformly at random from {−1, 1} and let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) be drawn
independently from the (θ, τ)-Bernoulli model. Then for τ ≤ 1/4 and n ≤ 1
τ2
, we have with probability
1− δ over the samples that
log
Pr[θ = +1 | (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)]
Pr[θ = −1 | (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)] ∈
[
−15τ
√
2n log
2
δ
, 15τ
√
2n log
2
δ
]
Proof. For any sequence (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn), we can write
Pr[θ = +1 | (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)]
Pr[θ = −1 | (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)] =
Pr[(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) | θ = +1]
Pr[(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) | θ = −1] (4)
because Pr[θ = +1] = Pr[θ = −1]. We now simplify the right hand side to
Pr[(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) | θ = +1]
Pr[(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) | θ = −1] =
n∏
i=1
Pr[(xi, yi) | θ = +1]
Pr[(xi, yi) | θ = −1]
=
n∏
i=1
(
1
2 + τ
1
2 − τ
)yixi
(5)
where the second line follows from a simple calculation of the conditional probabilities.
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Writing zi = yixi, we next combine Equations (4) and (5) to
Pr[θ = +1 | (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)]
Pr[θ = −1 | (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)] = exp
(
τˆ
n∑
i=1
zi
)
,
where τˆ is such that exp(τˆ) = 1+2τ1−2τ . For τ ≤ 14 , a simple calculation shows that τˆ ≤ 5τ .
Conditioned on θ, the sum z =
∑n
i=1 zi has expectation 2τnθ ≤ 2τn. Hoeffing’s Inequality (e.g.,
see Theorem 2.8 in [6]) then yields that with probability 1− δ/2
z ≤ 2τn+
√
2n log
2
δ
.
It follows that with probability 1− δ/2 (taken over the samples z1, . . . , zn), the likelihood ratio above
is bounded by
exp(τˆ
∑
i
zi) ≤ exp
(
2τˆ τn+ τˆ
√
2n log
2
δ
)
Under the assumptions that n ≤ 1
τ2
, we have
τn ≤ √n
and the upper bound follows because the first term in the exp is at most twice the second term. The
lower bound is symmetric.
We next evaluate the `∞ robustness of the optimal linear classifier.
Lemma 30. Let θ? ∈ {−1,+1}d and consider the linear classifier fθ? for the (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model.
Then,
`τ∞-robustness: The `τ∞-classification error of fθ? is at most 2 exp(−τ2d/2).
`3τ∞-nonrobustness: The `3τ∞-classification error of fθ? is at least 1− 2 exp(−τ2d/2).
Near-optimality of θ?: For any linear classifier, the `3τ∞-classification error is at least
1
6 .
Proof. Let (x, y) be drawn from the (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model. Then for the linear classifier w = θ?,
we have
E[〈w, yx〉] = 2τ〈w, θ?〉 = 2τd .
Let S denote the set
S = {(x, y) : 〈w, yx〉 ∈ [τd, 3τd]} .
Hoeffing’s Inequality (e.g., see Theorem 2.8 in [6]) then gives
Pr[(x, y) 6∈ S] = Pr [〈w, yx〉 6∈ [τd, 3τd]] ≤ 2 exp(−τ2d/2) .
On the other hand, for a parameter ε,
sup
e∈Bε∞
〈w, e〉 = ε‖w‖1 = εd .
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Thus if ε < τ , then for any (x, y) ∈ S,
inf
e∈Bε∞
〈w, y(x+ e)〉 > 0 ,
so that any (x, y) ∈ S is `τ∞-robustly classified. On the other hand, for ε > 3τ , for any (x, y) ∈ S,
inf
e∈Bε∞
〈w, y(x+ e)〉 < 0 ,
so that (x, y) is not `3τ∞-robustly classified.
Finally, let w′ be any other linear classifier. Then we have
E[〈w′, yx〉] = 2τ〈w′, θ?〉 ≤ 2τ‖w′‖1 ,
Let Ei be a ±1 random variable with expectation 2τ . We observe that the random variable yxiw′i is
stochastically dominated by Ei · |w′i| (note that yxi is itself a ±1 random variable with expectation
2τ). We can now write Ei as
E = Ai +Bi ,
where the random variable Ai is in {0, 1} and has expectation 2τ . The random variable Bi is in
{−1, 0, 1} and has a symmetric distribution that depends on A. In particular, Bi = 0 iff Ai = 1
and Bi is a Rademacher random variable otherwise. Since Ai is non-negative, we can use Markov’s
inequality on
∑
i|wi|Ai. The Bi’s have a symmetric distribution even conditioned on Ai so that∑
i|w′i|Bi ≤ 0 with probability at least 1/2. Thus with probability at least 1/6, we have
〈w′, yx〉 ≤ 3τ‖w′‖1 .
Thus for any ε > 3τ ,
inf
e∈Bε∞
〈w′, y(x+ e)〉 = 〈w′, yx〉+ inf
e∈Bε∞
〈w′, ye〉
≤ 3τ‖w‖1 − ε‖w‖1
< 0 .
Thus the `3τ∞-classification error of w′ is at least 1/6.
Lemma 30 implies that the most interesting robustness regime for linear classifiers is ε = O(τ).
For larger values of ε, it is impossible to learn a linear classifier with small robust classification error
regardless of the number of samples used.
We now focus on this robustness regime and establishes a lower bound on the sample complexity
of `ε∞-robust classification for ε ∈ (0, τ).
Theorem 31. Let gn be a linear classifier learning algorithm, i.e., a function that takes n samples
from {−1,+1}d ×±1 to a linear classifier w ∈ Rd. Suppose that we choose θ? uniformly at random
from {−1,+1}d and draw n samples from the (θ?, τ)-Bernoulli model with τ ≤ 1/4. Let w then be
the output of gn on these samples. Moreover, let ε < 3τ and 0 < γ < 1/2. Then if
n ≤ ε
2γ2
5000 · τ4 log(4d/γ)
the linear classifier fw has expected `ε∞-classification error at least
1
2 − γ.
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Before we proceed to the formal proof, we briefly explain the approach at a high level. Informally,
Lemma 29 above implies that for small n, the algorithm gn is sufficiently uncertain about each
co-ordinate θ?i so that in expectation, the dot product 〈w, θ?〉 is small compared to ‖w‖1. Since the
`1 norm ‖w‖1 is dual to the `∞ norm bounding the adversarial perturbation, it can be related to the
adversarial robustness of the classifier w on a fresh sample x. This then leads to the lower bound
stated above, as we will now prove in more detail.
Proof. Let S be the set of n samples input to gn and let w be the resulting classifier as defined in
the theorem. Our first goal is to bound the uncertainty in the estimate w by establishing an upper
bound on |E[θ?i |S]| for each i ∈ [d], which will in turn allow us to bound Eθ? [〈w, θ?〉|S].
We have
E[θ?i |S] = P[θ?i = +1|S]− P[θ?i = −1|S] .
We first consider the case that P[θ?i = +1|S] ≥ P[θ?i = −1|S], which means that the conditional
expectation E[θ?i |S] is non-negative. Hence it suffices to provide an upper bound on this quantity. The
lower bound in the complementary case P[θ?i = +1|S] < P[θ?i = −1|S] can be derived analogously.
We have
E[θ?i |S] = P[θ?i = +1|S]− P[θ?i = −1|S]
= P[θ?i = −1|S]
(
P[θ?i = +1|S]
P[θ?i = −1|S]
− 1
)
≤ 1
2
(
P[θ?i = +1|S]
P[θ?i = −1|S]
− 1
)
(6)
where we used the assumption P[θ?i = +1|S] ≥ P[θ?i = −1|S] (and hence P[θ?i = −1|S] ≤ 1/2).
Next, we bound the ratio of probabilities by invoking Lemma 29 (note that we have τ ≤ 1/4 and
n ≤ 1/τ2 as required). With probability (1− γ2 ), S is such that for all i ∈ [d] we have
Pr[θ?i = +1 | S]
Pr[θ?i = −1 | S]
∈
[
exp
(
−15τ
√
2n log
4d
γ
)
, exp
(
15τ
√
2n log
4d
γ
)]
.
Substituting this into Equation (6) then yields
E[θ?i |S] ≤
1
2
(
exp
(
15τ
√
2n log
4d
γ
)
− 1
)
≤ 15τ
√
2n log
4d
γ
where we used the inequality ex − 1 ≤ 2x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 (note that the upper bound on n in the
theorem implies that the argument to the exponential function is in this range).
Combining the bound above with the analogous lower bound gives
|E[θ?i |S]| ≤ 15τ
√
2n log
4d
γ
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so that
Eθ? [〈w, θ?〉|S] =
d∑
i=1
Eθ? [wiθ?i |S]
=
d∑
i=1
wi · Eθ? [θ?i |S]
≤ 15τ
√
2n log
4d
γ
· ‖w‖1 .
We condition on such an S for the rest of this proof.
The second part of the proof will bound the classification margin the linear classifier w achieves
on a fresh sample x. Incorporating the class label y, this margin is the quantity y〈w, x〉. From the
first part of the proof, it follows that
E
θ?,(x,y)
[〈w, yx〉] = 2τ · Eθ? [〈w, θ?〉]
≤ 30τ2
√
2n log(4d/γ) · ‖w‖1 .
To simplify the following calculation, we introduce the shorthand an = 30τ2
√
2n log(4d/γ). Next,
we provide a tail bound on 〈w, yx〉. Similar to Lemma 30, we observe that the random variable
yxiwi is stochastically dominated by Ei · |wi| where Ei is a ±1 random variable with expectation an.
We can again write Ei as
E = Ai +Bi ,
where the random variable Ai is in {0, 1} and has expectation an. The random variable Bi is in
{−1, 0, 1} and has a symmetric distribution that depends on A. In particular, Bi = 0 iff Ai = 1
and Bi is a Rademacher random variable otherwise. Since Ai is non-negative, we can use Markov’s
inequality on
∑
i|wi|Ai. The Bi’s have a symmetric distribution even conditioned on Ai so that∑
i|wi|Bi ≤ 0 with probability at least 1/2. Thus with probability at least 1−γ2 , we have
〈w, yx〉 ≤ an
γ
‖w‖1 .
Using the upper bound on n from the theorem statement, we have
an
γ
≤ 30τ
2
√
2n log(4d/γ)
γ
< ε .
Next, consider the strongest adversarial perturbation e ∈ Bε∞ for a given w, i.e., the vector e ∈ Rd
achieving
min
e∈Bε∞
〈w, e〉 .
By duality, the minimum value is exactly ε‖w‖1. Hence conditioned on the samples S and the bound
on 〈w, yx〉, the adversarially perturbed point x+ e is mis-classified because
y〈w, x〉 = y〈w, x〉+ y〈w, e〉
< ε‖w‖1 − ε‖w‖1
= 0 .
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The overall probability of this event occuring is at least 1− γ2 (conditioning on S) times 1−γ2 (bound
on 〈w, x〉). Since (
1− γ
2
)(1− γ
2
)
≥ 1
2
− γ .
this completes the proof.
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Figure 4: Complete experiments for adversarially robust generalization for `∞ adversaries. For each
dataset and training ε we report the performance of the corresponding classifier for each testing ε.
We observe that the best performance on natural examples is achieved through natural training and
the best adversarial performance is achieved when training with the largest εtrain considered.
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Figure 5: Complete experiments for adversarially robust generalization for `∞ adversaries for
standard networks (top row) and networks with thresholding (bottom row) for the MNIST dataset.
Thresholding corresponds to replacing the first convolutional layer with two channels ReLU(x− ε)
computing ReLU(x−(1−ε)). For each training εtrain we report the performance of the corresponding
classifier for each testing εtest. For natural training, we use thresholding filters identical to those
used for εtrain = 0.1. We observe that in each case, explicitly encoding thresholding filters in the
network architecture boosts the adversarial robustness for a given training εtrain and training set
size.
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